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The recent Hobby Lobby case decided by the U. S. Supreme Court in favor of Hobby Lobby's 
request to be granted the right to "sincerely held religious beliefs" and therefore to deny 
insurance coverage of certain contraceptive medications and services to their female employees 
sparked a national conversation about a host of controversial issues, including the right of 
women to reproductive choice, the status of corporations in American jurisprudence, and the 
status of religion in American law and politics. What has not been addressed in nearly as much 
detail are the specifically theological presuppositions (and misunderstandings) supporting the 
Hobby Lobby lawsuit and the Supreme Court's decision, The justices ruling in Hobby Lobby's 
favor (infamously) refused to rule on the legitimacy of the plaintiffs' "sincerely held religious 
beliefs" because such a ruling would be an infringement of their religious freedom. However, 
what the plaintiffs and the justices failed to recognize is the unique definition and function of 
religious language and beliefs and also that there is a fundamental and necessary distinction 
between faith and belief that, had it been understood and acknowledged, very likely would have 
swayed the case in a different direction. Instead, the Supreme Court confuses beliefs for faith and 
establishes the unassailability of any belief that is "sincerely held," whether or not there is any 
evidence (empirical, logical, or otherwise) for such beliefs. With the help of theologian Paul 
Tillich and philosopher William Clifford, I will reflect on the Hobby Lobby decision as a glaring 
example of the dangers of misconstruing the meaning of religious language and of confusing 
faith and belief.  
